

Secondary Server Certificates

Moving Certificates to the HTTP/2 Framing Layer

- ▶ Martin, just now: HTTP/2 frames for presenting certificate chain and proof of private key possession
- ▶ Could we use the same frames to present certificates in the opposite direction?

Possible advantages

- ▶ More flexible certificate management
 - ▶ Servers can maintain distinct certificates for different sets of names
 - ▶ Easier to replace one without others (see: ACME)
- ▶ Better coalescing
 - ▶ Often good for performance
 - ▶ Single CDN has many authoritative names it serves
- ▶ Potential option for encrypted SNI
 - ▶ Connect to a well-known name/cert
 - ▶ Include request for “actual” desired certificate after SETTINGS frame

Possible disadvantages

- ▶ *See Eric's talk on Monday about ways coalescing can go wrong*
- ▶ Certificate handling in the HTTP layer
 - ▶ “We do this all the time! What could go wrong?”
- ▶ Duplicated code for certificate management
 - ▶ True with client certs as well - duplicative code in
- ▶ Second attack vector for cert spoofing

Changes needed to client cert model

- ▶ Reverse direction
 - ▶ Client sends challenges, server sends certificates
 - ▶ Client cert explicitly omits the reverse direction rather than prohibiting it
- ▶ Properties in request
 - ▶ Server sends client a list of allowed cert issuers
 - ▶ Client wants to send server a single desired end-entity name
- ▶ Stream binding
 - ▶ Client certs start/end on-stream (CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, USE_CERTIFICATE)
 - ▶ Server certs typically need to be requested before request is made
 - ▶ Exception: Cross-domain server push?

Flow

