Chair: Mark Nottingham
Scribe: Ted Hardie
Mark reviewed the (old) note well and a scribe is selected. Eliot Lear acted as jabber relay.
Julian Reschke summarized the status of HTTP/1.1 Draft 26. Julian expressed hope that next time we can announce RFC numbers. Since Vancouver there have been two sets of drafts, one set on lETF last call and one on IESG comments. Review of 7 years of effort (including a picture of the editors which can be included). 2616 subversion comments.
The IANA registries have been created and/or updated; the drafts are in the RFC Editor queue, with 11-document cluster. Publication expected in 6 weeks or so.
Julian reviewed some of the changes which occurred (see Slide 9 of Julian’s deck). Julian then reviewed draft-reschke-http-status-308-07, which is currently in the RFC Editor queue, but now needs updates to deal with the changes in HTTP since it was written. Julian then discussed the steps needed to retire RFC 2617 (finishing Basic and Digest in HTTPauth).
Mark then reviewed the Zurich Interim, covering both the Interop aspects and the security discussion. Mark notes that the group is chartered to complete last call in April.
http2.github.io is now the tracking point for implementation effort tracking.
Mark then noted that a large contingent of the implementation efforts are in Japan, and there was a short Local Activity Report in Japan (http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/89/slides/slides-89-httpbis-2.pdf). A review of the various meet-ups was accompanied by discussion of existing tests (e.g. the HPACK Test Case). They also mentioned http2.info, which has a set of resources, and it will include a Japanese translation of the specification.
They will write an I-D containing a summary of the efforts so far. Mark suggests that there might be value in cross-linking the sites or moving the repositories to be collocated, and he thanked the presenters again for the efforts of their community.
Editor’s slides are: http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/89/slides/slides-89-httpbis-3.pdf. Martin began the review going through the summary slide (“Since -09”), which is largely editorial work. This gives him hope that we are very close to done. He’s trying to use this presentation to discuss how many stand between the working group and conclusion. (See slides 4 & 5 for the list reviewed). Martin then picked a subset of this (“The Hard Ones”). HPACK security is one; there are some issues but there are potential ways forward. Priority has too many options. A group of these (“The Snarls”) are things that must be pulled apart. At the time of writing the slides there were 28 issues of which 18 were design.
ALPN update was given by Andre Popov - Slides
Most of the focus was on slide 8, which reviewed the changes since IETF88. The IESG has evaluated and approved the ALPN draft; there are minor updates required from IESG review. The biggest change is the removal of the text which forbad the sending of an alert unless a negotiation supporting it had occurred; it can now be sent without negotiation. Andrew then reviewed the ALPN Deployment *.google.com servers have ALPN enabled; Chrome and IE11 support application protocol negotiation via ALPN. Andrew then reviewed the methods for working around ClientHello issues; draft-agl-tls-padding describes the work around. Codepoint for the workaround has been approved by the IESG and request sent to IANA (IANA issue: 747903). Julian asks whether this is a common issue [meeting interrupted by evacuation warning; meeting resumed at 13:35]. Andre replied that it is not everyone that needs that, but if your client hello sizes are large, you definitely need that. A question was whether IE would have the issue with large domain names? Andre noted that it was possible, but that they have not seen issues.
The group then started review of the HTTP issues list. Mark suggests that we start by working on the two sets which are not as involved, in the hope that we can make quick progress on those.
Roberto just raised a new issue around structured tokens use with ALPN tokens.
Marks first asks whether that is an issue for the HTTPbis working list or TLS. Roberto says that this is an issue for the registry; Ted Hardie says that this is an issue for utilization of the registry. Martin says that the concern of over-use is not valid, because the numbers we were discussing is small. 4 or 8 are reasonable inferences for what we are talking about now, and those are reasonable numbers.
Ekr says it is important to distinguish between conserving space in the registry and conserving space in the client hello. Roberto says he is concerned that is used for more than HTTP, and that it may cause issues. Mark suggests that this issue is connected to the websockets issue which will be dealt with later. Patrick McManus agrees that this is scoped to HTTPbis, and he believes that the current combinatorials that this is not an issue. Will Chan agrees that the current issues are not a problem but he believes that Roberto’s issue is future-proofing and that we could see these combinatorials in a few years.
EKR notes that the issue here is that there is binary matching approving something with a more complex matching semantic needs to be done now. Will Chan agrees, but believes we do not need to block current work. The group agrees that in the short term approach will be to restrict the characters included in the registry entries, in order to preserve the possibility in the possibility. Yutaka Hirano notes that they are considering defining ALPN tokens for websockets, and the presumption is that they will abide by the token agreement (cf. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hirano-httpbis-websocket-over-http2-00).
“As long as the security properties are appropriate for the scheme” will be added for the mixed schemes issue.
RESOLUTION: Constraining ALPN tokens formally isn’t in-scope for this WG, but we’ll endeavor not to use special characters.
The group then discussed the consistency of settings; Mike Belshe had suggested that all settings be included in all settings frame. In HTTP/2 there is no settings extensibility, so this may make sense. Martin prefers that there be no particular recommendations or requirements here. Will said he doesn’t want to bikeshed too much on this, but he would have preferred to send it always. Roberto said he liked Martin’s suggestion. Issue deferred to the editor’s judgement.
RESOLUTION: agreed to defer to Martin’s judgement (who favoured #3).
The group returned to the issue of mixed settings.
Emile is concerned that it has happened only for five hours. Mark asks whether there should only be one scheme per connection?
Emile proposes that the document say it is not safe to mix them.
EKR asks if we are not pre-deciding the issues Roberto raised in Zurich about sending HTTP schemes over HTTPS.
Patrick says he believes the document is silent on this.
Ekr is worried about us being silent on this? What do servers do? Martin says that there are a bunch of things here. The intent is to send their HTTP queries over their TLS connection. How do you get to the point that you are going to get to that. He felt we were never going to actively prevent the request for any URI over these connections. (Potentially with a “scheme unsupported” return code).
Ekr doesn’t want this to be unspecified.
Emile wants to record that multiplexing HTTP over HTTPS may increase the performance, but there are a lot of things in the middle path that will be lost.
Mark notes that the question is how we structure the specification over how you determine what is safe.
Will Chan suggests that this is not the issue to decide the broadest issues under, but he confirms that we really need to be able send multiple URI schemes transports over a single connection.
Patrick believes that the security requirements issue needs to be resolved separately, but it is not necessarily true that you need to fold your insecure http over your secure transport.
Eliot notes that it is important that the service be able to indicate what it will accept.
Mark clarifies that this issue resolution will be editorial noting that it is possible, and leave the larger issues to a different discussion. He asks if that is okay, and Larry Masinter is not.
Larry notes that the capability was restricted to the proxy case; Mark notes that Roy disagrees.. Eliot asks that this simply be deferred as a design issue. Mark does so.
The group moved on to Change the way we identify plain text HTTP/2, but Martin noted that this might be a bike shed.
Mark notes that this might not be–does the identifier for ALP describe the entire stack–so that there are different ALPN identifiers for http/tcp vs. http/udp vs. http/tls.
Martin notes that Roberto was the strongest advocate for something else in this space.
Robert says he does not want to change what we are doing now. Clarification asked of Roberto and he agrees.
Peter Lepeska comments that this feels very ad hoc; he feels that they will eventually need to be structured. Eventually there is going to be.
Mark reminds him that we just had that discussion. He feels it is not well defined now; Martin notes that an alternate will make it obvious that there is no structure.
Roberto also raised default max stream; Martin asked that this be deferred until after HPACK and this is agreed.
RESOLUTION: will use two identifiers, and they will identify the stack used. Editor to choose specific ids.
“Authoritative” restrictions issue; Martin reviewed the text in HTTP1.1 and he proposes that we references the 1.1. text directly for this issue.
Mark had previously expressed the desire to make it possible to change this meaning; Martin responds that this change should require and updating RFC.
RESOLUTION: Martin to use HTTP/1 text.
The group then discussed GZIP and deflate; SPDY had required their support no matter what you said on the wire.
There seems to be consensus on the list to require at least one; should we require both?
Martin’s read was that we had roughly gravitated to gzip; he’ll take that if there is no objection.
EKR then asked whether we have worked through the security consideration here? Exactly the same compression issues we see other places may be present here? Note that this not required to use. Ekr says that this has the effect of endorsing compression;
Mark asks whether his counter is to removing compression, since it is already there.
Ekr says that we should have that discussion, and that he had the impression that this was basically unsafe.
Patrick McManus notes that there is a security/performance trade-off and the performance advantage is very real. The web currently runs on this, and there is one corner case where this is an issue.
Martin asks whether security considerations text would cover the issues.
EKR suggests that they try to write such considerations and see whether the result makes people side. Will Chan wants to re-affirm that the issue here is that intermediaries strip out accept-encoding gzip; this makes it possible to use without intermediaries’ activity impacting this. He feels security considerations are necessary.
Kathleen Moriarity would like to have the discussion happen before the decision being made.
Mark notes that there are two things going on: should we make the assumption that gzip is present in the client; the second is should gzip being used in the web context or not. If there are security considerations to gzip, we should talk about them, but removing this is likely a non-starter.
Roberto said this requirement for static data is so fundamental to performance that HTTP/1 would likely be faster if we denied its use in HTTP/2.
Julian asked if we are asking also for server support for this.
Patrick believes we could revisit the decision, but the current question was gzip or gzip/deflate; he feels that the answer here is gzip. If we need a separate issue for security considerations around gzip for the web, we can do that.
EKR thinks that is satisfactory.
Bill Mills thinks that the issue isn’t solved by a security consideration, then the issue is really about how the leakage occurs and that this needs to be addressed; yes, it is
Peter Lepeska notes that gzip over not-TLS does not have this issue; IE11 will support http2 over not-TLS with gzip, so this may increase the amount of data sent in that mode. That’s valid.
For this issue: gzip only; a new issue will be opened.
RESOLUTION: gzip only + editorial massaging.
Martin’s understanding of this space is that something like gzip is pretty minimal, and he’s wanted this in the past. This will get taken to the list.
The group then moved to discuss the issue of websockets.
In Zurich, the discussion concluded that there would be no direct support for it at this stage. If folks needed slight help to improve the layering, it might be supported.
Mark notes that you could carry ws over the current alpn identifier, and if that created problems, then a new alpn identifier would be created.
Salvatore Loreto, Hybi chair, noted that they don’t have much energy for this and want to close. Can this work go into HTTPbis.
Mark noted that this made him nervous and he’d need to talk to the ADs on the topic. Robert said that this applies to WS and other protocols, and at least as interestingly, loadbalancing them all. We’d need the RST for unsupported scheme thing. Mark clarifies that this was a proposal for an RST error code at the HTTP/2 layer. Mark opens a new issue for this.
Martin is concerned that this might create trouble if things are available for some parts of the URI path tree. There is some discussion here with respect to the authority section of the URI; this is going down to the scheme now. He’s wondering if that is an HTTP error. Is there a need to make this up one level?
Mark says don’t try to kill too many birds with one stone. He feels it may be better to make an HTTP status code.
Ted Hardie argues that you want to scope that for the common case, and that the common case is “nothing from that transport layered here”.
Mark pushes back that we actually have status codes that have a wide variety of scopes in HTTP and this could be one of those; Ted replies that this may not be the case for all things being layered on top.
Martin agrees that this is a scoping problem and believes that you can get the right scope with an HTTP status code.
Will Chan notes that when they started this at Chrome, they used NPN for it, so that there was no need for stream-level issues or errors.
EKR that this does not make sense with ALPN.
Patrick discussed how the alt svc drafts does this same indication.
EKR believes that we want some method of discovering when an existing connection can be reused for a different scheme, and he could be talked into many methods of making that work.
Mark believes that we don’t have a decision on this at the moment and discussion should continue.
Huffman codes reviewed briefly and agreed it is on track for mechanical resolution.
DNS-based Upgrade discussed.
Eliot doesn’t think this should block HTTP/2; it sounds like nice follow-on work; it should work for both HTTP/2 and any subsequent versions. The issue he has on SRV is that it may require multiple queries; he’s happy to experiment with folks who want to work on performance problems.
Roberto said that in all cases on out-of-band knowledge, the browser or client MUST be willing to learn that it now fails. DNS is no different from having learnt from a prior connection in-band.
Martin says that we can solve this after we send the spec to the IESG.
Patrick does not want to block HTTP/2 on this; there are some corner cases that make this difficult; he suggests that including DNS as a potential source of prior knowledgde and leave it at that.
Emile comes up to say that it is not his intention to block over HTTP/2; he does, however, want to discover when content can be found on an other point.
Roberto agrees that it does not block, but you should suggest how HTTP/2 if it is not successful. If you believe you can connect on HTTP/2 and you fail to connect, does it fall back or not? [Note that this is not limited to this prior knowledge source]. Needs more discussion.
Patrick notes this is addressed in alt svc; review it and discuss on Wednesday.
Martin replies to Emile’s suggestion that we’re chartered to allow for discover ports over 80 or 443; he agrees we have items that may allow for that, but we’re not required to provide that discovery.
RESOLUTION: this is decoupled from the HTTP/2 spec and not blocking it; we may see more experimentation / discussion.
Herve reviews the options.
Martin prefers option one; he believes the second would have interesting side effects.
Roberto is ambivalent
Mark asks for comments from other folks who implement HPACK; Nick replies that he is also ambivalent, and he is not religiously opposed to the first.
Hasan echoed Nick’s position. At best ambivalence, with a preference not to make changes.
Herve will not lie in the road to get this, it’s not critical–a nice to have.
RESOLUTION: Closed with no action.
Scribe: Eliot Lear
####: 270 Priority leveling
Herve Ruellan: Define specific values for group weights
0 = no resource should be allocated
255 = all resources
Martin Thomson: This may be a “foot gun” (a gun to be pointed at a foot)
Will Chan: Disagrees with the use case to pause connections. Suboptimal
Mnot: keep in mind null priority (all priorities) are advisory
Roberto: Pausing is served by flow control, which flows through all intermediaries.
Next approach: Dependency-based stream ordering (see slides)
Rob Trace: what happens when you close S1? Dependencies are expressed to levels and not to streams themselves
Mnot: high level decision: dependency-based approach or group-based approach? This appears more complex, but may not be.
Rob Trace: looking at it, simpler to implement.
Hasan: priorities are not necessary to get the protocol correct, but to get it more efficient. Easier for client, a little more work on the server.
Larry Masinter: (missed it)
Rob Trace: agrees dependency on server side is more complex.
Hasan: this reflects what the clients are already doing for http/1.1. For a server, this is additional work on the server.
Mark: as compared to grouping?
Martin Thomson: not just clients- can we end up in a situation where there’s a need for garbage collection.
Barry channeling Roberto: Hasan will have access to a set of requirements I set out, but apparently not to the list that might be interesting to discuss.
Martin: there are some differences in the transitive properties. Might be nice to be able to simply move an intermediate node to another level in the tree.
Hasan: this is the only proposal that doesn’t incent gaming, and e
Peter L: explain why proxy case is not addressed.
Hasan: you lose too much information- if you have a large number of connections and you have a finite list of groups, you’ll lose information. For perfect fidelity we would need to do a complete dependency tree, which people don’t do, but this seems like a reasonable approach.
mnot: we need a framework to make a decision; would like to solve this today.
Will: current experience is NOT catastrophic… there could be serious issues here. people are trying to use finer granularity. flat priority scheme causes some issues.
Roberto: what we have right now is terrible across proxies
Mnot: consensus that what we currently have is not acceptable
Mnot: on the table
Martin: directed graph or priority levels?
Will: levels would require gaming protection. Since we don’t know how many resources are on the page and we have this large level space, i would divide space by two or by some factor to preserve space for resources that might come. But as the page builds, we’d do inserts. With fixed levels, you’d have to do heuristics to guess the right thing.
Martin: need to emphasize being careful about focusing on browsers.
Mnot: not hearing progress on the issue. Doesn’t see a way to make the decision.
Hasan: Client has a whole lot more information on motives than intermediary. I as an intermediary writer view this as a server.
Rob Trace: aggregation of connections.
???: Intermediaries may not be able to use priorities
Will: we’ll experiment on SPDY.
Pat: let’s pick and charge ahead
Rob: let’s not block.
Coin flip: Tails was dependency approach which won
RESOLUTION: going with the dependencies.
MNOT: is there a way to add additional entropy?
Julian: we could just remove authorization header from hpack
Martin Thomson: we can’t just patch this with a blacklist for a set of headers, because we don’t know how people use http headers to carry stuff, and we don’t know what needs to be protected.
Martin: consider all use cases, including those of intermediaries. in cases of connection coalescing, need to handle mutually distrustful circumstances:
Will, Martin: MAX_CURRENT_STREAMS (?) won’t address this concern.
Option 1: origin isolation.
Careful it isn’t perfect unless groups (or referrer) are sent along with the request, thanks to intermediaries.
Option 2: attach a penalty
Option 4: If you’re making a request, cross origin requests don’t get to compress.
Scribe: Peter Saint-Andre
Eric: risk here is that we have to kill compression entirely, which is where we’re going in TLS
Martin: you can unilaterally decide not to use the header tag
Eric: you can use Huffman coding
Martin: or not
Roberto (from Jabber): The most important thing right now is signaling that is durable across intermediaries about the incompressibilty of something. This requires a single bit in the headers. And by signaling I mean signaling that something should not be compressed.
Pat: Maybe all we need an informational document or security considerations
Mark: The emerging approach I see is to add a bit indicating that a given header is not compressible, define security considerations around that.
Eric: That seems like the best we can do.
Roberto (from Jabber): A single bit in the headers is more efficient. You don’t want to compress any of that data for a CORS request against one that isn’t.
RESOLUTION: agreed to have a single bit in the header format indicating that it can’t be compressed, and add Security Considerations about this attack, with potential options.
As per discussion on #373, closing 416 with wontfix.
Mark: what do we want to do here?
Martin: We had a discussion about this in TLS WG yesterday but it did not conclude, but I think we can probably say no here. Might be better to look outside TLS for this feature. Would need some kind of signal that you need to go off and do this. There are so many issues here that I do’t think we can recommend TLS renegotiation.
Eric: Yes that would work. (1) we don’t care about use case (2) we demand that TLS solve it (3) we define an HTTP mechanism
Mark: interesting to think about how we’d layer in an HTTP mechanism
Eric: I think need to decide now which approach we’re going to take
Mark: we could define an HTTP status code later
Martin: I’d like to see it as an HTTP status code. We do need to decide what path to take. Write down the options and put it to the mailing list to start some discussion.
Mark: my sense of the room is that we don’t want to do TLS negotiation, and find a group of interested folks to come up with a proposal.
Will: I don’t like TLS renegotiation, but I’m thinking through the implications. For example possible CDN cases. Are we setting ourselves up for failure here? We do get bug reports about client certificates.
Eric: Even a better approach might have interop issues (not supported). I don’t think CDNs and such are target use cases here.
Mark: Not trying to develop a solution today, only figure out direction and I think we have rough agreement that it’s not TLS renegotiation.
[end of topic]
Pat: should we be extending current usage or define something better?
Mark: before we get to WGLC we’ll consider this.
Eric: my sense is that Chrome experimented with this and had good results.
Will: In our experience this doesn’t break anything.
Stephen Farrell: I would encourage improvements over what we do now, this is a way to get a good security win.
Mark: May be best to have a discussion about alt-svc overall.
Martin: I think this is closed but we were waiting for feedback.
[end of topic]
Mark: Do we want to put this in the main HTTP2 stack?
Martin: there are a number of things here that I consider optional, but in general this seems to be what we need to do. I like Patrick’s characterization of this being CNAME in the HTTP world.
Mark: for high-level features I’m not hearing any major pushback
Martin: at the moment this is informational and I’d like to retain that
Mark: the load-shifting use case is important here, and ALTSVC frame is designed to address that.
Martin: this is goaway and then come back - is ALTSVC good enough?
Mark: layering matters here, need to be careful
Rob: mandatory to implement?
Mark: not really, different scenarios
Rob: would not want to hold up the spec
Pat: not a lot of point in making it MUST
Will: I think this has to be advisory
Mark: request to shift and use that alternate service when viable, so it’s not a true goaway code
Rick: I’d like to see another field for extensibility about security features (e.g., TLS 1.3)
Pat: the CNAME model is really good, so are routes in a routing table
Rob: major case here for load balancing - does this work better as a separate draft to open up extensibility?
Mark: need to have some proportion of clients to support this for it to be at all useful
Rob: as long as it’s not a MUST and as long as we’re not going to hold up progress on the core spec
RESOLUTION: agreed to using ALTSVC frame for this.
Will: this will take an RTT
Martin: I find this to be a bit weird - just send and react appropriately if it fails, why not use NOT_AUTHORITATIVE instead?
Mark: do we want to define something here? seems so
Mark: same host, can’t switch for security reasons
Julian: framework and header in separate document, then the frame in core?
Mark: we can talk about document organization later
Martin: if we’re doing the frame, we’re doing the header
Mark: cover this in our draft?
Martin: I think it’s hard to avoid having this feature once we support the other parts of this proposal
Martin: people will do it anyway
Will: it would just be undefined
Mark: just talking about documenting the pattern
Will: I’d rather not make a decision right now
Mark: does anyone think that’s a bad idea?
RESOLUTION: support for documenting this, but not requiring it.