This document specifies the ORIGIN frame for HTTP/2, to indicate what origins are available on a given connection.
Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTP working group mailing list (firstname.lastname@example.org), which is archived at https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/.
Working Group information can be found at http://httpwg.github.io/; source code and issues list for this draft can be found at https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/labels/origin-frame.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as “work in progress”.
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 28, 2018.
Copyright © 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
HTTP/2 [RFC7540] allows clients to coalesce different origins [RFC6454] onto the same connection when certain conditions are met. However, in certain cases, a connection is not usable for a coalesced origin, so the 421 (Misdirected Request) status code ([RFC7540], Section 9.1.2) was defined.
Using a status code in this manner allows clients to recover from misdirected requests, but at the penalty of adding latency. To address that, this specification defines a new HTTP/2 frame type, “ORIGIN”, to allow servers to indicate what origins a connection is usable for.
Additionally, experience has shown that HTTP/2’s requirement to establish server authority using both DNS and the server’s certificate is onerous. This specification relaxes the requirement to check DNS when the ORIGIN frame is in use. Doing so has additional benefits, such as removing the latency associated with some DNS lookups.
The ORIGIN HTTP/2 frame ([RFC7540], Section 4) allows a server to indicate what origin(s) [RFC6454] the server would like the client to consider as members of the Origin Set (Section 2.3) for the connection it occurs within.
The ORIGIN frame type is 0xc (decimal 12), and contains zero or more instances of the Origin-Entry field.
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ | Origin-Entry (*) ... +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
An Origin-Entry is a length-delimited string:
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ | Origin-Len (16) | ASCII-Origin? ... +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
- An unsigned, 16-bit integer indicating the length, in octets, of the ASCII-Origin field.
- An OPTIONAL sequence of characters containing the ASCII serialization of an origin ([RFC6454], Section 6.2) that the sender believes this connection is or could be authoritative for.
The ORIGIN frame does not define any flags. However, future updates to this specification MAY define flags. See Section 2.2.
The ORIGIN frame is a non-critical extension to HTTP/2. Endpoints that do not support this frame can safely ignore it upon receipt.
When received by an implementing client, it is used to initialise and manipulate the Origin Set (see Section 2.3), thereby changing how the client establishes authority for origin servers (see Section 2.4).
The origin frame MUST be sent on stream 0; an ORIGIN frame on any other stream is invalid and MUST be ignored.
Likewise, the ORIGIN frame is only valid on connections with the “h2” protocol identifier, or when specifically nominated by the protocol’s definition; it MUST be ignored when received on a connection with the “h2c” protocol identifier.
This specification does not define any flags for the ORIGIN frame, but future updates to this specification (through IETF consensus) might use them to change its semantics. The first four flags (0x1, 0x2, 0x4 and 0x8) are reserved for backwards-incompatible changes, and therefore when any of them are set, the ORIGIN frame containing them MUST be ignored by clients conforming to this specification, unless the flag’s semantics are understood. The remaining flags are reserved for backwards-compatible changes, and do not affect processing by clients conformant to this specification.
The ORIGIN frame describes a property of the connection, and therefore is processed hop-by-hop. An intermediary MUST NOT forward ORIGIN frames. Clients configured to use a proxy MUST ignore any ORIGIN frames received from it.
Each ASCII-Origin field in the frame’s payload MUST be parsed as an ASCII serialisation of an origin ([RFC6454], Section 6.2). If parsing fails, the field MUST be ignored.
See Appendix A for an illustrative algorithm for processing ORIGIN frames.
The set of origins (as per [RFC6454]) that a given connection might be used for is known in this specification as the Origin Set.
By default, the Origin Set for a connection is uninitialised. When an ORIGIN frame is first received and successfully processed by a client, the connection’s Origin Set is defined to contain an initial origin. The initial origin is composed from:
- Scheme: “https”
- Host: the value sent in Server Name Indication (SNI, [RFC6066], Section 3), converted to lower case
- Port: the remote port of the connection (i.e., the server’s port)
The contents of that ORIGIN frame (and subsequent ones) allows the server to incrementally add new origins to the Origin Set, as described in Section 2.2.
The Origin Set is also affected by the 421 (Misdirected Request) response status code, defined in [RFC7540], Section 9.1.2. Upon receipt of a response with this status code, implementing clients MUST create the ASCII serialisation of the corresponding request’s origin (as per [RFC6454], Section 6.2) and remove it from the connection’s Origin Set, if present.
- When sending an ORIGIN frame to a connection that is initialised as an Alternative Service [RFC7838], the initial origin set (Section 2.3) will contain an origin with the appropriate scheme and hostname (since Alternative Services specifies that the origin’s hostname be sent in SNI). However, it is possible that the port will be different than that of the intended origin, since the initial origin set is calculated using the actual port in use, which can be different for the alternative service. In this case, the intended origin needs to be sent in the ORIGIN frame explicitly.
- For example, a client making requests for “https://example.com” is directed to an alternative service at (“h2”, “x.example.net”, “8443”). If this alternative service sends an ORIGIN frame, the initial origin will be “https://example.com:8443”. The client will not be able to use the alternative service to make requests for “https://example.com” unless that origin is explicitly included in the ORIGIN frame.
This specification adds an entry to the “HTTP/2 Frame Type” registry.
- Frame Type: ORIGIN
- Code: 0xc
- Specification: [this document]
Clients that blindly trust the ORIGIN frame’s contents will be vulnerable to a large number of attacks. See Section 2.4 for mitigations.
Relaxing the requirement to consult DNS when determining authority for an origin means that an attacker who possesses a valid certificate no longer needs to be on-path to redirect traffic to them; instead of modifying DNS, they need only convince the user to visit another Web site in order to coalesce connections to the target onto their existing connection.
As a result, clients opting not to consult DNS ought to employ some alternative means to establish a high degree of confidence that the certificate is legitimate. For example, clients might skip consulting DNS only if they receive proof of inclusion in a Certificate Transparency log [RFC6929] or they have a recent OCSP response [RFC6960] (possibly using the “status_request” TLS extension [RFC6066]) showing that the certificate was not revoked.
The Origin Set’s size is unbounded by this specification, and thus could be used by attackers to exhaust client resources. To mitigate this risk, clients can monitor their state commitment and close the connection if it is too high.
5.1. Normative References
- Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
- Rescorla, E., “HTTP Over TLS”, RFC 2818, DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
- Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile”, RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
- Eastlake 3rd, D., “Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions”, RFC 6066, DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.
- Barth, A., “The Web Origin Concept”, RFC 6454, DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>.
- Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., “Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)”, RFC 7540, DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
- Leiba, B., “Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words”, BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
5.2. Informative References
- Nottingham, M., “Web Linking”, RFC 5988, DOI 10.17487/RFC5988, October 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5988>.
- DeKok, A. and A. Lior, “Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) Protocol Extensions”, RFC 6929, DOI 10.17487/RFC6929, April 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6929>.
- Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. Adams, “X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP”, RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
- Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., “Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing”, RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
- Nottingham, M., McManus, P., and J. Reschke, “HTTP Alternative Services”, RFC 7838, DOI 10.17487/RFC7838, April 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7838>.
The following algorithm illustrates how a client could handle received ORIGIN frames:
- If the client is configured to use a proxy for the connection, ignore the frame and stop processing.
- If the connection is not identified with the “h2” protocol identifier or another protocol that has explicitly opted into this specification, ignore the frame and stop processing.
- If the frame occurs upon any stream except stream 0, ignore the frame and stop processing.
- If any of the flags 0x1, 0x2, 0x4 or 0x8 are set, ignore the frame and stop processing.
- If no previous ORIGIN frame on the connection has reached this step, initialise the Origin Set as per Section 2.3.
- For each Origin-Entry in the frame payload:
- Parse ASCII-Origin as an ASCII serialization of an origin ([RFC6454], Section 6.2) and let the result be parsed_origin. If parsing fails, skip to the next Origin-Entry.
- Add parsed_origin to the Origin Set.
The ORIGIN frame allows a server to indicate for which origins a given connection ought be used. The set of origins advertised using this mechanism is under control of the server; servers are not obligated to use it, or to advertise all origins which they might be able to answer a request for.
For example, it can be used to inform the client that the connection is to only be used for the SNI-based origin, by sending an empty ORIGIN frame. Or, a larger number of origins can be indicated by including a payload.
Generally, this information is most useful to send before sending any part of a response that might initiate a new connection; for example, Link header fields [RFC5988] in a response HEADERS, or links in the response body.
Therefore, the ORIGIN frame ought be sent as soon as possible on a connection, ideally before any HEADERS or PUSH_PROMISE frames.
However, if it’s desirable to associate a large number of origins with a connection, doing so might introduce end-user perceived latency, due to their size. As a result, it might be necessary to select a “core” set of origins to send initially, expanding the set of origins the connection is used for with subsequent ORIGIN frames later (e.g., when the connection is idle).
That said, senders are encouraged to include as many origins as practical within a single ORIGIN frame; clients need to make decisions about creating connections on the fly, and if the origin set is split across many frames, their behaviour might be suboptimal.
Senders take note that, as per Section 4 of [RFC6454], the values in an ORIGIN header need to be case-normalised before serialisation.
Finally, servers that host alternative services [RFC7838] will need to explicitly advertise their origins when sending ORIGIN, because the default contents of the Origin Set (as per Section 2.3) do not contain any Alternative Services’ origins, even if they have been used previously on the connection.